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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT C. HILL, AUDREY HILL, 
RUSSELL W. MANGUM, CAROLE 
MANGUM, and HILL MANGUM 
INVESTMENTS, a Utah general 
partnership, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
v. 
SEATTLE FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE SEATTLE FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
I. STATEMENTS OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Appellee, Seattle First National Bank 
("Seattle-First"), takes issue with Appellants' (hereinafter col-
lectively referred to as "Plaintiffs" or "Appellants") STATEMENT 
OF ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL. 
Docket No. 890375 
Priority No. 16 
Plaintiffs1 Statement Seattle-First's Statement of 
the of the Issues of the Issues 
1. Whether a genuine issue 
of material fact exists 
which should have precluded 
the awarding of summary 
judgment in favor of the 
defendant? 
1. Should the court's sum-
mary judgment in favor of 
Seattle-First as to the sec-
ond cause of action of the 
complaint be sustained where 
the plaintiffs alleged that 
Seattle-First breached a 
contract by failing to 
present plaintiff's con-
struction loan to First 
Security Bank pursuant to a 
take-out loan commitment, 
where it is undisputed that 
plaintiffs had no rights 
under this take-out 
commitment? 
2. Whether the trial court 
erred in applying the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel 
to the plaintiffs' claims 
against Seattle First 
National Bank? 
2. Should the court's summary 
judgment in favor of Seattle-First 
as to the second cause of action 
of the complaint be sustained on 
the basis that plaintiffs are col-
laterally estopped from 
re-litigating the issue as to 
whether the written take-out com-
mitment between The Citizens Bank 
and First Security Bank created 
any rights in favor of the plain-
tiffs, where this identical issue 
was fully and fairly litigated in 
a federal court lawsuit? The Cit-
izens Bank v. Brent C. Hilly et 
al., Civil No. 86C-1020J, (D. Ut. 
May 2, 1988). 
- 2 -
3. Should the court's summary 
judgment in favor of Seattle-First 
as to the fourth cause of action 
of the complaint be sustained 
where plaintiffs alleged that 
Seattle-First failed to provide 
financing to individual condomin-
ium buyers, where it is 
uncontroverted that Seattle-First 
received only one presentation 
from plaintiffs for individual 
condominium owner financing which 
did not meet Seattle-First's lend-
ing guidelines? 
4. Further, should the court's 
summary judgment as to the fourth 
cause of action be sustained 
because plaintiffs failed to file 
any affidavits that attest that a 
breach of an oral agreement to 
provide individual condominium 
owner financing occurred within 
four years of the filing of the 
complaint and the claim is, there-
fore, barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations, Utah Code 
Annotated 78-12-25? 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This is an appeal from a grant of a Motion For Summary 
Judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. This Court's inquiry 
is whether there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, 
or, even according to the facts as contended by the plaintiffs, 
whether Seattle-First is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Arrow Industries v. Zions First National Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 937 
(Utah 1988); D&L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989); 
accord, Copper State Leasing v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture, 
770 P.2d 88, 89 (Utah 1988), reh'g denied. The facts and all 
inferences drawn therefrom should be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs as the non-moving party. Ron Case 
Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc., 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). The 
plaintiffs must, however, demonstrate by affidavits, depositions 
or answers to interrogatories that specific facts exist which 
preclude summary judgment. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. No deference is to be given to the trial court's view 
of the law; it is to be reviewed for correctness. Ron Case Roof-
ing, 773 P.2d at 1385. 
All undisputed facts set forth by Seattle-First in its 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R.047-156) are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 
4-501(5) of the Rules of Judicial Administration because plain-
tiffs failed to file any objection or statement opposing 
Seattle-First's motion as required by Rule 4-501(5). 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Background 
This lawsuit arises from a loan made by The Citizens 
Bank (hereinafter "Citizens") in 1980 to plaintiffs, Brent C. 
Hill, Audrey Hill, Russell W. Mangum, Carole Mangum and Hill 
Mangum Investments, a Utah general partnership, in which Brent C. 
Hill and Russell Mangum are partners. The loan (hereinafter "The 
Citizens Bank loan) was to finance construction of a condominium 
project known as Garden Towers in the Avenues area of Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Seattle First National Bank (hereinafter 
"Seattle-First") purchased a participation in The Citizens Bank 
loan. Plaintiffs1 action is for damages claimed to be the result 
of alleged wrongful acts by Seattle-First in connection with The 
Citizens Bank loan. Specifically, plaintiffs have alleged as 
their second cause of action that Seattle-First breached a con-
tract by failing to properly tender The Citizen Bank loan to 
First Security Bank (hereinafter "First Security") for a take-out 
loan. As their fourth cause of action, plaintiffs have alleged 
that Seattle-First breached a promise to make loans to individu-
als wishing to purchase a Garden Towers condominium unit. 
The Citizens Bank loan was secured by a trust deed con-
veying the Garden Towers condominium project, made and delivered 
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by plaintiffs to Citizens. The loan matured on May 1, 1983 and 
fell into default. On December 13, 1984, Citizens filed a law-
suit to foreclose in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County. 
The Citizens Bank v. Hill Manqum Investments, et al.f Civil No. 
C-84-7385 (hereinafter "Citizens Bank lawsuit"). In late 1985, 
Citizens was taken over by the Utah Department of Financial 
Institutions. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (herein-
after "FDIC") was named as receiver and The Citizens Bank loan 
was acquired by the FDIC in its corporate capacity. 
The FDIC removed The Citizens Bank lawsuit to the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah (FDIC v. 
Hill Manqum Investments, et al.t Civil No. 86C-1020J). The Hon-
orable Bruce Jenkins granted partial summary judgment in favor of 
the FDIC and entered a decree of foreclosure on September 3, 
1987. Although Hill Mangum Investments filed a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy petition, the FDIC obtained relief from the automatic stay 
and the condominium project was sold by the U.S. Marshal on Feb-
ruary 9, 1988. On March 18, 1988, Judge Jenkins granted summary 
judgment for the deficiency against Brent C. Hill, Audrey C. 
Hill, Russell W. Mangum and Carole J. Mangum in the amount of 
$3,960,874.00. Judgment was thereafter entered against 
Hill-Mangum Investments on April 13, 1990. No appeal was taken. 
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The complaint in the present action against 
Seattle-First is virtually identical to the counterclaim and 
third-party complaint filed in April of 1985 in The Citizens Bank 
lawsuit. Although named as third-party defendant, Seattle-First 
was never served in The Citizens Bank lawsuit. Rather, this sep-
arate lawsuit was commenced on November 25, 1987, just days after 
the FDIC had been granted relief from the automatic stay, appar-
ently as one further effort to stall the foreclosure sale of the 
condominium property. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The present lawsuit was initiated by the filing of a 
complaint (R.002) on November 25, 1987. On January 25, 1989, 
Seattle-First filed its Motion for Summary Judgment (R.029,030), 
its Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support Of Motion For 
Summary Judgment (R.047-156) and Affidavit of Alan C. Espey In 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R.031-045). The plain-
tiffs did not file any objection or statement opposing 
Seattle-First's motion. 
More than ten (10) days after the filing of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Seattle-First fi d^ a Notice to Submit Mat-
ter for Decision (R.157-158), pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Rules 
of Judicial Administration. On February 13, 1989, The Honorable 
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Michael Murphy entered an Order (R.159) granting Seattle-Firstfs 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The next day, February 14, 1989, 
plaintiffs filed a Request for Oral Argument and Extension of 
Time Within Which to File Memorandum (R.161). Thereafter, plain-
tiffs filed a Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment of Dismissal 
(R.168) with accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
(R.175-199) and Affidavit (R.169-171). This memorandum 
addressed the merits of Seattle-Firstfs Motion for Summary Judg-
ment. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed numerous affidavits and 
Seattle-First filed a Motion for Order Striking Affidavits 
(R.227-253). A hearing was held on May 1, 1989 to address Plain-
tiff's Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment of Dismissal. After 
hearing argument, Judge Murphy entered a Summary Decision and 
Order (R.308-311) on May 4, 1989, granting plaintiffs1 Motion to 
Set Aside the Judgment and relieving plaintiffs from the summary 
judgment. 
Because the May 1, 1989, hearing fully addressed the 
merits of Seattle-First's Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge 
Murphy found no further argument was necessary and took the 
Motion for Summary Judgment under advisement. 
On June 12, 1989, Judge Murphy entered a Memorandum 
Decision and Order (R.312-317) again granting Seattle-Firstfs 
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Motion for Summary Judgment. A Final Order of Dismissal in 
accordance with the Memorandum Decision was entered on July 25, 
1989, dismissing plaintiffs1 complaint in its entirety and this 
appeal followed. In this appeal plaintiffs claim only that sum-
mary judgment should not have been granted as to their second and 
fourth causes of action. 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on or about August 23, 
1989. Plaintiffs1 Docketing Statement was filed with the Supreme 
Court on October 10, 1987, nearly one month late. Although the 
Docketing Statement bears a certificate of service, it was never 
received by Seattle-First's attorneys. Plaintiffs' cost bond, 
which should have been filed; on August 23, 1989, has never been 
filed. Plaintiffs' Request for Transcript, which was due on Sep-
tember 4, 1989, was never filed; and finally, plaintiffs' State-
ment of the Issues, due on September 4, 1989, was never filed. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Seattle-First's, Material, Undisputed Facts Which 
Are Relevant to the Issues on Appeal 
1. In 1980 plaintiffs began the development of a 
ten-story condominium apartment tower in the Avenues area of Salt 
Lake City, known as Garden Towers. (Complaint 114 (R.003), Answer 
114 (R.020).) 
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2. Initially, plaintiff had intended to finance the 
construction with First Security Bank (hereinafter "First Secu-
rity" ). Before the loan was made, however, First Security found 
itself unable to make the loan. (Seattle-First's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
P.4, 112 (R.050) ("Seattle-First's Memorandum"); Deposition of 
Russell W. Mangum taken August 26, 1987, in conjunction with The 
Citizens Bank lawsuit, (hereinafter "Mangum depo."), pp. 18-21 
(R.139-142).) 
3. Plaintiffs then arranged for construction financing 
from The Citizens Bank (Complaint 115 (R.004), Answer 115 (R.020)). 
4. First Security issued a commitment letter addressed 
to The Citizens Bank wherein First Security agreed to provide 
take-out funding upon completion of construction if certain cri-
teria were met. This was the only take-out commitment that was 
issued. This written commitment created no rights in favor of 
these plaintiffs who were not parties to the agreement. (Final 
Judgment in Favor of FDIC Against Brent C. Hill, Audrey C. Hill, 
Russell W. Mangum and Carole J. Mangum, FDIC v. Hill Mangum 
Investments, et al.. United States District Court, District of 
Utah, Civil No. 86C - 1020J, 14 (R.154); Seattle-First's Memoran-
dum p.4, 114 (R.050) .) 
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5. The promissory note made by plaintiffs to The Citi-
zens Bank dated April 15, 1982, by its terms matured on May 1, 
1983. Seattle-First was not a party to the promissory note 
(R.082). 
6. The Citizens Bank tendered The Citizens Bank loan 
to First Security Bank which rejected the tender by The Citizens 
Bank under the First Security take-out commitment on July 1, 
1983. (Seattle-First's Memorandum p.6, HI5 (R.052); Exhibit 40 
to Mangum depo. (R.150); Mangum depo., p.40, lines 3-19 (R.143); 
See also Exhibits "H" and "I" to the appendix of appellants1 
brief.) 
7. Any agreement between Seattle-First and plaintiffs 
to provide financing for individual condominium purchasers was 
oral, not written. (Deposition of Brent Hill taken in conjunc-
tion with The Citizens Bank lawsuit, p.49, lines 5-16 (R.096); 
See also statement of plaintiffs1 counsel, Lorin Pace, transcript 
of hearing, May 1, 1989, p-10, lines 2-5). 
8. In August 1983, Seattle-First received one presen-
tation from plaintiffs for individual condominium unit financing 
— a proposed swap of an apartment/dormitory in Provo for three 
condominium units. After reviewing the proposal, Seattle-First 
determined it did not meet its lending guidelines. 
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(Seattle-First Memorandum, p. 7, 1116 (R.053); Affidavit of Alan C. 
Espey Aff. 114-6 (R. 033-034 ). ) 
B. Facts Set Forth in Appellants' Brief Disputed By 
Seattle-First 
Although summary judgment will not be granted when a 
genuine factual dispute exists, the facts relied on to show a 
genuine dispute must be supported by the record. Many of the 
facts included in Appellants1 unnumbered statement of facts are 
either completely irrelevant or immaterial to the issues on 
appeal or lack proper evidentiary foundation or are simply not 
supported by the record. Appellants1 most glaring inaccuracies 
are illustrated below: 
1. On page five of their principal brief, appellants 
state, "The second of those participation agreements dated Decem-
ber 14, 1981, was for 100% of the loan amount." It is 
uncontroverted that Seafirst was a 90% participant in The Citi-
zens Bank loan. (Seattle-First's Memorandum, p.5, 1111 (R.051).) 
2. On page five appellants state "In fact, Sea First 
acted and directed the plaintiffs as if it were the sole lender." 
Appellants1 reference to the record is to the affidavit of Neil 
Wilson (R.320) that was untimely filed two weeks after oral argu-
ment. Seattle-First filed an objection to this untimely 
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affidavit (R.339). Regardless, this fact, even if true, is nei-
ther relevant nor material to plaintiffs' claims, nor does it 
controvert the essential facts upon which the court based its 
grant of summary judgment as to the second and fourth causes of 
action. Plaintiffs1 claim in their second cause of action is 
that Seattle-First breached a contract by failing to tender The 
Citizens Bank loan to First Security Bank for a take-out commit-
ment. Plaintiffs1 claim to be a third-party beneficiary under an 
agreement between Citizens and First Security for a take-out loan 
commitment. In their fourth cause of action, plaintiffs claim 
that Seattle-First failed to provide financing to individual con-
dominium purchasers as promised. The above-stated fact that 
Seattle-First somehow directed the plaintiffs in some manner is 
simply not relevant or material to either of these claims. 
3. On page 5, appellants state, "Sea First directed 
Citizens to step back and remain out of the picture with the 
plaintiffs. " 
This supposed fact emanates from a loose translation 
from the Second Affidavit of J. R. Boswell (R.300). For the rea-
sons given immediately above, this fact, even if true, is again 
irrelevant and immaterial to plaintiffs' claims in their second 
and fourth causes of action. 
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4. On page 5, appellants state, "Seafirst and not Cit-
izens was directly involved in the construction and day-to-day 
operations at the Garden Towers condominium project, including 
the determination of a sales strategy and the real broker for the 
project." 
These facts are unsupported by the record. Plaintiffs 
cite to their complaint, as well as a faxed affidavit of Brent 
Hill and an affidavit of J. R. Boswell. Mr. Boswell's affidavit 
does not state or support this fact. Mr. Hillfs faxed affidavit, 
although lodged, was never filed and is inadmissible and mere 
allegations in the complaint, particularly those denied in the 
answer are insufficient to controvert Seattle-First's motion. 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Aside from the technical problems, the stated fact, 
even if true, is immaterial and irrelevant to the claims set 
forth in plaintiffs1 second and fourth causes of action. 
5. On page 6, plaintiffs state, "Citizens Bank and Sea 
First agreed to provide financing to the individual condominium 
purchasers." This fact is not supported by the record cited by 
plaintiffs and demonstrates an intentional effort to distort the 
record and the facts. Once again, appellants' reference is to an 
allegation in their complaint. They also cite to the affidavit 
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of Alan C. Espey, a Seattle First Vice-President who states, 
" . . . Seattle-First would have been willing to finance quali-
fied purchasers of units in Garden Towers, but Seattle-First was 
never presented with an opportunity to do so." (R.034, H7.) 
Plaintiffs also cite to the affidavit of J. R. Boswell who 
attests, " • . . Mr. Espey agreed to provide financing in his 
department with certain conditions and directed Citizens to take 
all applications and send them to him for review." (R.196.) 
Plaintiffs further cite to the faxed affidavit of Brent C. Hill 
(R.288) that nowhere states that "Seafirst agreed to provide 
financing to the individual condominium purchasers." 
6. On page 6 plaintiffs state, "Numerous applications 
for financing were submitted to Sea First by J. R. Boswell and 
Ned R. Fox." Again, plaintiffs have not supported this fact by 
the record. In fact, Judge Murphy found that plaintiffs had not 
presented admissible evidence of any particular individual condo-
minium purchaser financing arrangement which was wrongfully 
rejected by Seattle-First and that affidavit testimony that 18 
unspecified offers were submitted to Seattle-First was inade-
quate. (Memorandum Decision and Order, dated June 12, 1989. P.4 
(R.315). 
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The affidavits of J. R. Boswell and Ned R. Fox do not 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
7. On page 6 plaintiffs state, "Only one of these 
applications was responded to by Sea First despite their promise 
to make financing available." Plaintiffs cite to the complaint, 
answer and affidavit of Alan Espey. This fact is completely 
unsupported by the record and once again evidences a blatant 
attempt to distort the facts and the record. Although it is 
impossible to discern from appellants1 brief which paragraphs of 
the complaint, answer or Espey Affidavit are supposed to support 
this fact, paragraph 20 on page 5 of the complaint (R.006) 
states, "No loans to individual condominium purchasers were com-
pleted by said banks. . . . " In response, Seattle First answered 
in paragraph 20 on page 4 of its answer (R.022), "In response to 
paragraph twenty (20), defendant admits that Citizens Bank or 
defendant did not make loans to individual condominium purchas-
ers, but denies that they had any obligation to do so." 
Alan Espey attests on page 3 of his affidavit (R.033) 
that on only one occasion was Seattle-First approached in connec-
tion with the sale of a Garden Towers condominium. On that sin-
gle occasion, the plaintiffs requested Seattle-First to consider 
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financing a swap. The offer was to trade a 24-unit apartment 
building in Provo, Utah, with an appraised value of $550,000, for 
three Garden Towers1 condominiums with an aggregate price of 
$726,000, plus a Hill Mangum-owned building with $20,000 equity. 
Seattle-First rejected this deal. 
8. On page 6, plaintiffs state, "The take-out commit-
ment by FSB was rejected, and as a result, plaintiffs lost their 
interest in the Garden Towers project." The plaintiffs1 cita-
tions to the record only support the first half of this supposed 
factual statement. The take-out commitment by First Security 
Bank was indeed rejected on July 1, 1983 after Citizens Bank sub-
mitted The Citizens Bank loan to First Security Bank pursuant to 
an agreement between them. The second half of plaintiffs' state-
ment that they "lost their interest in the Garden Towers project" 
is nothing but plaintiffs1 unsupported conclusion which is 
entirely unsupported by the record. Mere unsubstantiated conclu-
sions are inadmissible. Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. 
Co., 771 P.2d 693 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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V. ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiffs Are Collaterally Estopped From 
Re-Litigating Their Second Cause of Action 
It is extremely difficult to determine from appellants1 
brief why they believe summary judgment of dismissal should not 
be sustained as to the second cause of action. The second cause 
of action of the complaint concerns an alleged breach of the 
First Security agreement for a take-out loan commitment. Indeed, 
it has been difficult from the beginning of this lawsuit to 
determine how plaintiffs could claim damages from the breach of 
an agreement between Citizens Bank and First Security Bank to 
which neither Seattle-First nor any of the plaintiffs were a 
party. Plaintiffs1 argument in its brief is vague; no legal the-
ory is presented other than that summary judgment should not have 
been granted. No mention is made of facts set forth in admissi-
ble affidavits that plaintiffs believe controvert Seattle-Firstfs 
motion and absolutely no authority is presented for plaintiffs' 
argument. A lone reference is made to the affidavit of Benjamin 
H. Christiansen, of First Security Bank. (R.192). Seattle-First 
filed a motion to strike virtually every paragraph of Mr. 
Christiansen's affidavit (See Motion for Order Striking Affida-
vits (R.227, 241). Aside from the fact that Mr. Christiansen's 
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affidavit represents a theory which is irrelevant, his statements 
are conclusory. He lacks personal knowledge and his statements 
are pure hearsay. The issue here is not whether Seattle-First 
had some involvement in First Security's failure to honor its 
take-out commitment. Rather, the issue is whether plaintiffs had 
any rights under an agreement for a take-out commitment to which 
they were not a party. 
Plaintiffs and their counsel have apparently forgotten 
since the filing of their docketing statement, that their theory 
as to their second cause of action is that the plaintiffs are 
third-party beneficiaries of the Citizens/First Security agree-
ment for a take-out commitment. (See Plaintiffs1 Reply Memoran-
dum of Points and Authorities, p.4 (R.283); Docketing Statement, 
p.6, 115(a)). 
In neir docketing statement under the heading, "ISSUES 
ON APPEAL," plaintiffs state: 
(a) The District Court dismissed the Second Cause of 
Action, on grounds that the Federal Court made a 
finding that the Plaintiff was not a party to the 
contract. Plaintiff alleges that this finding was 
made under Lanqley. Absent Langley, Plaintiff 
could have been a third party beneficiary with 
established rights. 
(b) Whether the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel 
applies to a party not a party top nor involved in 
the ongoing action. 
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Neither of these issues has been properly set out and 
argued in plaintiffs' brief. Instead, plaintiffs have made some 
rather unusual, vague, ambiguous and unsupported arguments. 
The clear issues upon which this court must focus are: 
1. Did the plaintiffs have any rights under the 
Citizens/First Security agreement for a take-out 
loan commitment; and 
2. Was this issue previously resolved against these 
plaintiffs in The Citizens Bank lawsuit in U.S. 
District Court so that plaintiffs are collaterally 
estopped from re-litigating this issue again. 
Shortly after Citizens agreed to make the Citizens Bank 
loan, it entered into an agreement with First Security for First 
Security to buy the Citizens Bank loan after the Garden Towers 
condominiums had been completed. (See letter dated March 31, 
1980 (R.324, 325), included in the appendix hereto.) In fact, 
Citizens tendered the loan to First Security on July 1, 1983 
(R.335) and First Security rejected the tender (R.337). This 
agreement between Citizens and First Security, by its terms, was 
clearly intended for the benefit of Citizens. There is nothing 
in the terms of the agreement which awards any kind of a benefit 
to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have never explained in their 
pleadings or otherwise how they were supposed to benefit from 
First Security's purchase of The Citizens Bank loan. 
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In The Citizens Bank lawsuit in federal court, the 
defendants (plaintiffs herein) filed a counterclaim against Citi-
zens alleging that Citizens had not properly tendered the loan to 
First Security. These allegations were again made verbatim 
against Seattle-First in the present lawsuit, (Compare counter-
claim in The Citizens Bank lawsuit, H35-39 (R.127) with complaint 
H35-39 (R.Q09)). 
Because The Citizens Bank case was virtually identical 
to the present action, Seattle-First has relied, in part, on the 
collateral estoppel effect of the Final Judgment (R.152) entered 
by Judge Jenkins. Plaintiffs urge that there can be no collat-
eral estoppel because the federal court's holding was made exclu-
sively upon the basis of W. T. Lanqely v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 98 
L.Ed.2d 340 (1987). The Lanqely decision was merely a reitera-
tion by the United States Supreme Court of long-standing statu-
tory and federal common law defenses available to the FDIC acting 
in its corporate capacity. It is readily apparent upon reading 
the Final Judgment at H4 (R.152), that Judge Jenkins determined 
that there were no genuine issues of material fact or of law con-
cerning whether the take-out commitment evidenced any interest in 
favor of these plaintiffs and that his finding on this issue had 
nothing whatsoever to do with Lanqely and its progeny. 
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Specifically, Judge Jenkins found that it was undis-
puted that the only written take-out commitment was between The 
Citizens Bank and First Security Bank. The defendants (plain-
tiffs herein) were not parties to that commitment and its written 
terms do not disclose any rights in favor of defendants (plain-
tiffs herein). (Final Judgment 114 (R.154). This is an issue 
wholly independent of the federal court's application of Lanqley. 
This issue has, therefore, been litigated and plaintiffs are col-
laterally estopped from re-litigating the issue again in this 
lawsuit. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Copperstate Thrift and 
Loan v. Brune, 735 P.2d 387 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987) quoting Searle 
Bros, v. Searlef 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978), set forth the follow-
ing test for application of collateral estoppel: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
identical with the one presented in the action in 
question? 
2. Was there final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, fully 
and fairly litigated? 
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The issue decided by Judge Jenkins in The Citizens Bank 
lawsuit is identical to that presented here. Did plaintiffs have 
any rights under the agreement for a take-out commitment. The 
answer is, "no." 
The summary judgment entered by Judge Jenkins was a 
final judgment on the merits. Stokke v. Southern Pac. Co., 169 
F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1948). No appeal was taken. It was entirely 
proper for Judge Murphy to grant Seattle-First's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the basis of the summary judgment entered in The 
Citizens Bank lawsuit. See 10A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure, § 2735 (1983). 
In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 58 
L.Ed.2d 552, 99 S.Ct. 645 (1979), the Supreme Court stated the 
importance of defensive collateral estoppel. The Court, quoting 
its earlier decision in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Uni-
versity of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 28 L.Ed.2d 788, 91 
S.Ct. 1434 (1971) stated: 
In any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the mutu-
ality principle, is forced to present a complete 
defense on the merits to a claim which the plaintiff 
has fully litigated and lost in a prior action, there 
is an arguable misallocation of resources. To the 
extent the defendant in the second suit may not win by 
asserting, without contradiction, that the plaintiff 
had fully and fairly, but unsuccessfully, litigated the 
same claim in the prior suit, the defendant's time and 
money are diverted from alternative uses — productive 
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or otherwise — to relitigation of a decided issue. 
And, still assuming that the issue was resolved cor-
rectly in the first suit, there is reason to be con-
cerned about the plaintiffs' allocation of resources. 
Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as 
long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out 
reflects either the aura of the gaming table or fa lack 
of discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of 
the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for 
fashioning rules of procedure.1 Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. 
C-O-Two Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185, 72 S.Ct. 219, 222, 96 
L.Ed. 200 (1952). 
Plaintiffs in the instant litigation are the identical 
parties which filed and litigated the counterclaims in The Citi-
zens Bank lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs have stepped aside from their initial claim 
that they were somehow third-party beneficiaries and have instead 
presented a vague, unsupported argument that the issues in the 
Citizens Bank lawsuit regarding the take-out commitment are not 
identical to the issues in the present case. Their argument now, 
although difficult to pinpoint, appears to be that Seattle-First 
somehow owed plaintiffs a responsibility to present the loan to 
First Security and that this duty or responsibility arose from 
the participation agreement between Citizens and Seattle-First. 
The participation agreement, however, as a matter of law created 
no relationship between Seattle-First and these plaintiffs. Ten 
Mile Industrial Park v. Western Plains Service Corporation, 810 
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F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1987). This attempt to boot strap supposed 
obligations to the plaintiffs under the Citizens/Seattle-First 
participation agreement with a supposed contractual duty to the 
plaintiffs under the Citizens/First Security agreement makes 
absolutely no sense and not surprisingly plaintiffs1 argument is 
unsupported by the law or the record in this case. 
Returning to plaintiffs1 theory that was presented to 
the trial court and their only theory that reasonably appears to 
be based on any type of a legal foundation, plaintiffs cannot be 
third-party beneficiaries. For a third party to have enforceable 
rights under a contract, that party must be an intended benefi-
ciary of the contract, and the intention of the parties is to be 
determined from the terms of the contract as well as the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances. The intent of the contracting 
parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit must be clear. 
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomguist, 773 P.2d 
1382 (Utah 1989). 
Judge Jenkins determined that plaintiffs had no rights 
under the take-out commitment. This issue has been litigated; 
the facts are uncontroverted. Plaintiffs were not third-party 
beneficiaries. Seattle-First is entitled to rely on the collat-
eral estoppel effect of The Citizens Bank lawsuit. Judge 
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Murphy's decision was correct. Seattle-First is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law as to the second cause of action. 
B. Summary Judgment Should Be Sustained as to the 
Fourth Cause of Action 
1. Plaintiffs' affidavits were inadequate to raise a 
genuine issue as to any material fact. Plaintiffs1 fourth cause 
of action concerns allegations that Seattle-First orally agreed 
to provide financing to individual purchasers of the Garden Tow-
ers condominiums at market rates, but later refused to do so when 
loan applications were presented. Alan C. Espey, a Seattle-First 
Vice-President attests in his affidavit that on only one occasion 
was an application ever presented to Seattle-First for condomin-
ium owner financing (R.032-033). This involved a swap of an 
apartment building in Provo, Utah, for three Garden Towers units. 
Mr. Espey went to Provo, checked out the property and reached a 
determination that the proposed deal would not meet 
Seattle-First's lending guidelines. To counter this assertion, 
plaintiffs filed numerous affidavits claiming that eighteen such 
individual condominium purchasers had applied to Seattle-First 
for financing. 
Plaintiffs1 affidavits absolutely failed to identify a 
single particular for any one of these supposed loan applicants. 
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Not a single name was given, nor a date on which the application 
was supposedly forwarded to Seattle-First. Each affidavit failed 
to set forth any specific facts which would preclude summary 
judgment in favor of Seattle-First on this issue. Rule 56(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in pertinent part, states: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and sup-
ported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as other-
wise provided in this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appro-
priate, shall be entered against him. 
Having failed to adequately controvert Seattle-First's 
Motion for Summary Judgment with specific facts showing a genuine 
issue for trial, Judge Murphy correctly found plaintiffs1 affida-
vits to be inadequate to raise a genuine issue as to a material 
fact and entered judgment in favor of Seattle-First. 
2. Plaintiffs' claim is barred by the applicable stat-
utes of limitations. Plaintiffs' claim is based on an oral 
agreement made by Seattle-First to provide financing for individ-
ual condominium purchasers. (See Statement by Plaintiffs' coun-
sel, Lorin Pace, Transcript of hearing, May 1, 1989, p.10, lines 
2-5 (R. 356)). The statute of limitations for breach of an oral 
agreement is four years. Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25. The 
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plaintiffs failed to present any admissible evidence of any par-
ticular purchase financing arrangement within the four-year 
period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. Judge 
Murphy correctly found plaintiffs1 affidavit testimony that eigh-
teen unspecified offers were submitted to Seattle-First "between 
August 1983 to date of foreclosure" was wholly inadequate. This 
decision was correct. (See Memorandum Decision and Order, p.4 
(R.315).) 
Plaintiffs have failed to controvert, by adequate 
admissible evidence, Mr. Espey's claim that the only offer made 
for individual purchaser financing was the Provo apartment swap. 
The grant of summary judgment should, therefore, be 
affirmed as to the fourth cause of action. 
VI. THIS APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, Seattle-First requests damages including double costs and 
its reasonable attorney fees incurred in responding to what is 
purely a frivolous appeal. 
This appeal is not grounded in fact. In order to pre-
vail, plaintiffs must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue 
as to a material fact that: 
1. Plaintiffs had some right under the 
Citizens/Seattle-First take-out commitment; or 
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2. Certain, specific offers for individual condomin-
ium owner financing were presented to 
Seattle-First. 
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that single material 
fact exists. 
Plaintiffs' appeal is not warranted by existing law. 
Plaintiffs have no grounds, based on the uncontroverted facts to 
claim any rights under the First Security take-out commitment. 
Furthermore, plaintiffs' argument concerning the application of 
collateral estoppel in this case is specious and wholly unsup-
ported by the law. 
This appeal was interposed solely to harass 
Seattle-First and to needlessly increase the cost of litigation. 
Therefore, Seattle-First should be awarded double costs 
and attorneys' fees or such other relief as may be determined by 
this court. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have departed from their theory concerning 
their second cause of action into a vague, unsupported argument 
that does not justify reversing the lower court's grant of sum-
mary judgment. 
Likewise, plaintiffs have failed to adequately contro-
vert Seattle-First's contention that only one offer was ever 
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presented to it for individual condominium financing. Judge 
Murphy's grant of Summary Judgment as to the second and fourth 
causes of action was appropriate and correct. Therefore, 
Seattle-First prays this court to affirm the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment of dismissal and to award Seattle-First dou-
ble costs and attorney's fees associated with defending this 
appeal. , 
DATED this jfZ? day of June 1990. 
W. Cullen Battle 
P. Bruce Badger 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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A P P E N D I X 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third judicial District 
JUN 1 2 1989 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT C. HILL, et al., : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs, : 
CIVIL NO. C-87-7694 
vs. : 
SEATTLE FIRST NATIONAL BANK, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter is before the court on defendant Seattle First 
National Bank's ("Sea-First") Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Sea-First in part relies on the judgment in FDIC v. Hill 
Mangum Investments, Civil No. 86C-1020J (U.S. District Court for 
the District of Utah, April 29, 1988) ("FDIC action"). 
Plaintiffs rely on Langley v. FDIC, 98 L.Ed2d 340 (1987) to limit 
any collateral estoppel effect from the judgment in the FDIC 
action. As a consequence, this court must determine the 
applicability on this case of the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
in light of Langley. 
Langley did not involve the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
It merely construed Section 2(13)(e) of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act of 1950, 12 U.S.C. Section 1823(e), which purports 
to insulate the FDIC, as the successor to the assets of a failed 
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bank, against certain claims and defenses of persons asserting an 
adverse interest in assets or security of the failed bank. 
Plaintiffs contend that because 12 U.S.C. Section 1823(e) is 
for the especial benefit of the FDIC/ Sea-First cannot invoke the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel premised on an FDIC judgment 
under 12 U.S.C. Section 1823 (e). There is some merit to 
plaintiffs' contention, but it goes too far. To the extent the 
judgment in question is not dependent on 12 U.S.C. Section 
1823(e), it may qualify to preclude relitigation of the same 
issues. 
The judgment in the FDIC action contains the following in 
its findings and conclusions: the defendants concede that 
alleged interest overcharges did not exceed $250,000.00 and the 
FDIC waived $250,000.00 in disputed interest in exchange for a 
judgment on the remaining deficiency. Because the factual issues 
concerning interest overcharges in the FDIC action were expressly 
essential to the entry of judgment and are again presented in 
this action, the resolution thereof in the FDIC action are 
entitled to collateral estoppel effect in this action. See, 
Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah 
App. 1987). These plaintiffs, then, have received the maximum 
potential benefit from alleged interest overcharges as a result 
of a $250,000.00 reduction in the deficiency judgment in the FDIC 
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action. The First Cause of Action in the instant case should 
therefore be dismissed. 
The judgment in the FDIC action further provided that the 
plaintiffs in the instant case were not parties to the written 
takeout commitment between Citizens Bank and First Security Bank 
and thus created no rights in their favor. The court in the FDIC 
action concluded from this that Langley barred their claims. The 
consequences flowing from Langley are not entitled to collateral 
estoppel effect but the plaintiffs in this action are 
collaterally estopped from challenging the independent, 
underlying findings and conclusions, i.e., the written commitment 
created no rights in favor of these plaintiffs. The Second Cause 
of Action should therefore be dismissed. 
The Third Cause of Action alleges tortious interference with 
business relations premised on alleged interest overcharges, the 
failure to effectuate the First Security takeout commitment, 
improper application of loan payments to interest rather than 
principal, and failure to provide purchaser financing for 
individual condominium units. The interest overcharge 
allegations and the failure of the takeout commitment have 
previously been addressed and neither can be a premise for any 
claims in this case. The last replacement note matured on May 1, 
1983 and the inference is that any misapplication of payments to 
interest therefore occurred more than four years prior to the 
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running of the four year statute of limitations, Section 78-12-
25, Utah Code Ann. Plaintiffs have failed to counter this 
inference in any affidavit and have not really addressed the 
allegation of misapplication of payments to interest. 
Furthermore, plaintiffs have not presented admissible evidence of 
any particular purchase financing arrangement which was 
wrongfully rejected by Sea-First within the four year limitations 
period. Affidavit testimony that 18 unspecified offers were 
submitted to Sea-First "between August, 1983 to the date of 
foreclosure" is inadequate. The Third and Fourth Causes of 
Action, then, should be dismissed. 
The Fifth Cause of Action, alleging fraud, fails to comply 
with Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding 
the deficiency, defendant chose to answer the complaint and 
proceed with discovery. The pending motion before the court is 
for summary judgment under Rule 56 and the pleadings, depositions 
and affidavits indicate there is no genuine issue of material 
fact. Defendant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law on the Fifth Cause of Action. The court, however, is 
persuaded that plaintiffs are entitled to amend their pleadings 
in an attempt to state a claim for fraud. 
At the hearing on defendant's motion, plaintiffs orally 
withdrew their Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action. 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, 
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as 
to the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Cause of Action. 
2. Plaintiffs are given until and including June 26, 1989 
in which to file an Amended Complaint setting forth a claim for 
relief for fraud as an amendment to their Fifth Cause of Action. 
3. The Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action are dismissed. 
Dated th i s 4± vu day of June, 1989. 
[LUJ *f. 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision and Order, postage prepaid, to 
the following, this id day of June, 1989: 
Lorin C. Pace 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
350 South 400 East, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
W. Cullen Battle 
P. Bruce Badger 
Attorneys for Defendant 
215 S. State, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION 
THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, a corporation 
organized under the laws of the 
United States, in its 
corporate capacity, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
HILL MANGUM INVESTMENTS, et al., 
Defendants. 
HILL MANGUM INVESTMENTS, et al., 
Counterclaimants, 
-vs-
THE CITIZENS BANK, 
Counterdefendant. 
HILL MANGUM INVESTMENTS, et al., 
Third-Party 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
SEATTLE FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Civil No. 86C-1020J 
FINAL JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF FDIC AGAINST BRENT C. 
HILL, AUDREY C. HILL, 
RUSSELL W. MANGUM AND 
CAROLE J. MANGUM 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on Friday, March 18, 
1988, at 2:45 p.m.f the Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins presiding. W. 
Cullen Battle and P. Bruce Badger appeared for the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") and Lorin N. Pace appeared 
for defendants Brent C. Hill, Audrey C. Hill, Russell W. Mangum 
and Carole J. Mangum ("defendants"). The FDIC renewed its motion 
for summary judgment in light of W.T. Lanqley v. Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp., 484 U.S. , 98 L.Ed. 2d. 340, 108 S.Ct. 
(1987), and the Court heard arguments on that motion. 
Based upon the arguments and statements of counsel, and 
the affidavits and memoranda in the file, the Court hereby enters 
the following findings and conclusions: 
1. A sale of the real property in question was held on 
February 9, 1988, pursuant to this Court's Summary Judgment, 
Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale, dated September 3, 1987, 
resulting in a deficiency after the sale of $4,149,329.41, as of 
February 10, 1988. 
2. Defendants conceded that all of their defenses to 
the deficiency were barred as a matter of law, except for the 
following: (1) defenses relating to the alleged misapplication of 
payments to interest instead of principal; (2) defenses relating 
to the alleged improper fixing of the applicable rate of interest 
as based upon Seattle First National Bank's prime rate; and (3) 
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defenses relating to the Citizens Bank's alleged failure to 
obtain a takeout of the loan from First Security Bank, 
3. Concerning the defenses relating to the misapplica-
tion of loan payments, it is undisputed that the payments in 
question were applied first to interest and then to principal. 
It is further undisputed that the loan documents of record 
between defendants and The Citizens Bank provided that payments 
to be applied first to interest and then to principal. Defen-
dants' defenses therefore rest upon an oral modification of the 
loan documents or upon an oral side agreement respecting the 
application of loan payments. Accordingly, the Court concludes 
that these defenses are barred as a matter of law under Langley. 
4. Concerning defendants' defenses relating to the 
First Security loan takeout commitment, it is undisputed that the 
only written takeout commitment was between The Citizens Bank and 
First Security Bank. The defendants were not parties to that 
commitment and its written terms do not disclose any rights in 
favor of defendants. Accordingly, to the extent that defendants 
claim rights under that commitment as against the FDIC, their 
claims are barred as a matter of law under Langley. 
5. As to defendants prime rate defenses, defendants 
concede that they could have been overcharged no more than 
$250,000.00 in interest, due to the fact that the promissory 
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notes contained an interest floor of fifteen percent (15%). The 
FDIC volunteered to waive the $250,000.00 in disputed interest in 
return for the entry of judgment as to the remaining amount of 
the deficiency. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and 
other good cause appearing therefore, 
THE COURT HEREBY ENTERS JUDGMENT in favor of the FDIC 
against defendants Brent C. Hill, Audrey C. Hill, Russell W. 
Mangum and Carole J. Mangum, in the amount of $3,960,874.40 
through March 17, 1988, with post judgment interest thereafter as 
provided by law. The Court hereby directs the entry of final 
judgment as to the FDIC's claims against said defendants and 
expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay for 
the entry of such judgment. 
BY THE COURT: 
Zopies mailed to counsel 5/2/88nw 
W. Cullen Battle, Esq. 
Maxwell Miller Esq. 
Joseph Anderson, AUSA 
Lorin N. Pace, Esq. 
Kent Shearer, Esq. 
Herschel Saperstein, Esq. 
John L. McCoy, Esq. 
i r ¥ c e S 7 J 
Dis tr i c t 
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Approved as to form: 
W. Cullen Battle 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorneys for the 
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 
Lorin N. Pace 
Attorney for Defendants 
Brent C, Hill, Audrey C. 
Hill, Russell W. Mangum 
and Carole J. Mangum 
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
M I M E l t FUST SfCURITY CORPORATION SYSTIM OF BANKS 
fOST OFFICE iOX 720, 405 SOUTH MAIN STIEH 
SAIT tAK! CITY, UTAH 84110 
March 31• 1980 
Citizens Mortgage Company 
285 West No- Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Gentlemen: 
By this le t ter , First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. (First Security) 
agrees on the terms and conditions set forth below to buy from Citizens 
Mortgage Company (CMC) a construction loan made by CMC to Brent C. Hil l 
and Russell M. Mangum not to exceed an original loan amount of $3,300,000.00 
The terms and conditions to be satisfied before First Security shall 
buy the loan are as follows: 
1 . The loan must be secured by a valid f i rs t lien on a completed 
9 story high-rise condominium project containing 39 units. 
An architect approved by First Security shall certify completion 
according to plans and specifications previously approved by First 
Security. At such time as the plans and specifications are 
submitted to First Security for approval, they shall be accompanied 
by a detailed Cost Breakdown, a Legal Description of the real 
property, al l legal documents to be used for creation of the 
condominium, and Appraisal and Market Study prepared by a level 3 
FNMA appraiser and such other documents as First Security may 
reasonably require in order to underwrite the project. 
2. The property shall be free from mechanics liens or other 
encumberances which would interfere with sales of individual 
units at the time that First Security purchases the loan, 
3. No portion of the security shall have been released except 
that individual condominium units may have been released 
i f the $3,300,000.00 original loan amount is reduced by the 
larger of the following amounts: 
a. 80* of the sales price of the unit, or 
b. The original loan amount divided by the total number 
of units in the project, with the result multiplied 
by 120%. 
EXHIBIT "A' 
p *~ '" " *" • 
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4. The loan amount shall be equivalent to the actual cost of 
construction of the units, or less, and shall not include 
land costs or profit to the developer. The land shall be 
owned by the developer free and clear of liens or encumberances 
at the time the loan is made. There shall be no subordination 
of the interest of any other party to the l ien. 
5. Interest shall be paid current to the day First Security 
purchases the loan. 
6. At the time that First Security buys the loan, the loan shall 
bear interest at a rate which meets the approval of First 
Security or the interest rate shall be subject to being 
modified by First Security without any requirement that the 
borrower approve the amendment. 3 - K ^ V V * * ^ v.^c**^, r**«- ,^«~st-
7. CMC shall account to First Security and demonstrate that all *•*•* * w 
funds have been disbursed for construction costs to the best of "Tv~"c 
CMC's knowledge. 
8. CMC shall give First Security 30 days written notice of CMCfs 
intent to sell the loan to First Security. The notice shall 
be addressed to Norval H. Lambert, First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A., Mortgage Loan Department, 405 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. The notice shall not be given 
less than 35 months from the date the loan is closed nor shall 
i t be given more than 38 months after the loan is closed 
and in no event shall First Security buy the loan after 
July 1 , 1983. 
This commitment shall expire on April 30, 1980 unless prior to that 
time written evidence is received by First Security that CMC has made the 
subject loan to Brent C. Hi l l and Russell M. Mangum. 
Dated this 31 day of March, 1980 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A. 
Norval H. Lamb^ct, Vice President 
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DY 
W. Cullen Battle, #A0246 
P. Bruce Badger, #A4791 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT C. HILL, AUDREY HILL, ] 
RUSSELL W. MANGUM, CAROLE MANGUM ] 
HILL MANGUM INVESTMENTS, a Utah ] 
general partnership, ) 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v. ] 
SEATTLE FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ] 
Defendant. ] 
> AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN C. 
> ESPEY IN SUPPORT OF 
> MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
> JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. C87-07694 
i Judge Michael R. Murphy 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF KING ) 
ALAN C. ESPEY, having been duly sworn upon his oath deposes 
and says: 
1. That I am a vice-president of Seattle First National 
Bank located in Seattle, Washington and have been an officer of 
the Bank since prior to 1980. 
2. I have personal knowledge of Seattle-First's 
participation in a $3,800/000 loan made by The Citizens Bank 
located in Salt Lake City, Utah to Brent C. Hill, Audrey C. 
Hill, Russell M. Mangum, Carole J. Mangum and Hill-Mangum 
Investments, a Utah General Partnership. True and correct 
copies of the certificates of participation as contained in 
Seattle-First's files are attached as Exhibit A, B and C 
hereto. The Citizens Bank loan was evidenced by a promissory 
note dated April 15, 1982 replacing an earlier note dated 
October 16, 1981 which replaced the original note dated 
April 22, 1980 and was secured by a Trust Deed dated April 22, 
1980, between The Citizens Bank and the borrowers. 
Seattle-First was not a party to the Citizens Bank notes, Trust 
Deed or any other documentation with the plaintiffs in this 
lawsuit relating to the Citizens Bank loan. Seattle-First's 
sole rights and interest with respect to the Citizens Bank loan 
are those set forth in the certificates of participation. 
3. As an officer of Seattle-First, I have personal 
knowledge of the prime rate of interest offered by 
Seattle-First. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit D is a 
true and correct summary of Seattle-First's prime rate history 
during the relevant period. Under the terms of the Citizens 
Bank loan note, the 15% per annum interest floor became 
operative when Seattle-First's prime rate was 12.75% or less. 
As set forth in the prime rate history, this occurred on 
October 13, 1982 when Seattle-First's prime rate dropped from 
13% per annum to 12% per annum. 
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4. I am aware generally of the allegations made by the 
plaintiffs in this lawsuit that Seattle-First failed to provide 
financing to individual purchasers of condominiums known as the 
Garden Towers in Salt Lake City. I have personal knowledge 
that on only one occasion was Seattle-First approached in 
connection with the sale of a Garden Towers condominium. This 
occurred in August 1983. 
5. On that one occasion the plaintiffs in this action 
requested Seattle-First to consider financing a swap. The 
offer was to trade a 24 unit apartment in Provo, Utah, known as 
the Brownstone, with a MAI appraisal value of $950,000 for 
three large condominiums in the Garden Towers with an aggregate 
list price of $726,000 plus a Hill Mangum owned building with 
an indicated $200,000 equity. 
The financing requested from Seattle-First did not involve 
financing the prospective purchaser who owned the Brownstone 
apartment but a loan by Seattle-First to Hill Mangum for 
$670,000 to be secured by the Brownstone apartment. The loan 
proceeds would be applied to the Citizens Bank note balance. 
6. I personally traveled to Salt Lake City to first see 
the Garden Towers condominium and then to Provo to inspect the 
offered Brownstone apartments. On inspection, the Brownstone 
was totally designed for college student dormitory housing and 
unsuitable for apartment use and in poor repair. Based on my 
investigation of the properties involved and my analysis of the 
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proposed transaction, I did not approve the requested $670,000 
loan by Seattle-First to the plaintiffs in this lawsuit. 
7. As manager of the Special Properties unit responsible 
for Seattle-First's participation in the Citizens Bank loan, I 
have personal knowledge that from and after the transfer of the 
Seattle-First's participation in the Citizens Bank loan to 
Special Properties in August of 1983, Seattle-First would have 
been willing to finance qualified purchasers of units in Garden 
Towers, but Seattle-First was never presented with an 
opportunity to do so. 
8. Seattle-First did receive reports from time to time of 
pending purchase offers received for Garden Tower units. 
However, each of the purchase offers reported to Seattle-First 
involved trading property rather than purchaser financing. 
Further, with the one exception of the Brownstone trade, 
Seattle-First was never approached or requested to participate 
or provide financing even with respect to any of these swap 
transactions. 
FURTHER, Affiant sayeth naught. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23rd day of January, 
1989. // 
NOTARY (ptJBLIC in and for the State , 
of Washington, residing at , &s{/fA/ri/iA^ 
My appointment expires 7//7/ *£^ 
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